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CARING FOR CHILDREN AND CARETAKERS
MARY BECKER*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, feminists in many disciplines have written about
care. Feminists have made moral and economic arguments for an
ethic of care. They have also explored various links between care and
equality.
In her 1997 book, Caring for Justice, Robin West argues that
justice and care are both required for moral decision making.' She
suggests that empathy grounded in an ethic of care could be the basis
for "a commitment to egalitarianism, albeit grounded in shared fellow
feeling rather than in principle."2 West concludes that "[o]f the two
commitments," "one from principle" (an abstract commitment to
equality for those similarly situated) and "one from fellow feeling"
(an empathy-based commitment to help those in need), the
commitment based on empathy may "prove to be the more
enduring."3
There is another way in which care and equality are linked. One
of the points West makes in her book, and a point made by an
increasing number of feminists writing about equality today, is that
until we place greater value on caretaking and provide better
supports for caretakers of dependents, women will continue to be
unequal.4  In her 1999 book, Love's Labor: Essays on Women,
Equality, and Dependency, philosopher Eva Kittay explores the link
between acknowledging dependency and valuing caregiving, on the
one hand, and equality for women on the other. She believes that
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I thank my partner, Joanne
Trapani, for many helpful political discussions. I thank Raizel Liebler and Nikki Czrriion for
wonderful research assistance. I thank the Dean of the DePaul College of Law, Teree Foster,
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1. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 72 (1997).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND
DEPENDENCY 186-88 (1999).
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equality will be possible only when there is a "social and political
commitment to ourselves as dependents and as dependency
workers. '5 I make a similar point in an article published in 1999,
arguing that only a feminism with values incompatible with
patriarchal values (i.e., relational feminism with its commitment to
care) has the potential to bring about real change in the status of
women.
6
In the 1999 book Care and Equality: Inventing A New Family
Politics, Mona Harrington, a lawyer and political scientist, argues that
care should be "a national political value":7
The key idea for a new politics of family care ... is to add care to
the pantheon of national social values. That is, to assure good care
to all members of the society should become a primary principle of
our common life, along with the assurance of liberty, equality and
justice.
We need to elevate care to this level of importance for the basic
reason that it is essential to human health and balanced
development. It is also crucial to developing human moral
potential, to instilling and reinforcing in an individual a sense of
positive connection to others. And it is this sense of connection
that makes possible the whole range of mutual responsibilities that
allow the people of a society to respect and work toward common
goals. As political theorist Joan Tronto puts it, thinking about care
seriously, recognizing that everyone at different times is both a
giver and a receiver of care, underscores for people the fact of their
personal and social interdependence. And, she says, this insight
can enhance a commitment to the responsibilities of democratic
citizenship. 8
In a March 2000 article in Nation, political scientist Deborah Stone
makes a similar argument, calling for a "care movement" because we
all need the right to care for others and to be cared for.9
During the 1990s, feminist economists developed parallel
arguments, identifying the raising of capable citizens as a public good,
i.e., a benefit to society in general (not only or exclusively a benefit to
those who invest in children). Nancy Folbre, for example, made this
5. Id. at 188.
6. See Mary E. Becker, Patriarch, and Iniequaity: Tuwurd3 u Substantive Feminism, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21.
7. MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EoUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS 44
(1999).
& Id. at 48-49 (citing JOAN TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT
FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1993)).
9. See Deborah Stone, Why We Need a Care Movement, NATION, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13.
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argument in a 1994 article and book.10 In a 1999 article, Paula
England joined Nancy Folbre in arguing that:
Because the production of children's capabilities creates a public
good that cannot be priced in the market, individuals can free ride
on the efforts of parents in general and mothers in particular. We
need to redesign the social contract in ways that encourage more
sustainable forms of intergenerational altruism and reciprocity."
Martha Fineman and Joan Williams have both played important
parts in this care movement. In her recent article Cracking the
Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency,
Fineman argues that caretaking produces a public good and therefore
warrants support from government and other institutions, including
accommodation of caretakers' needs by employers.12 In her recent
book, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What
to Do About It, Joan Williams analyzes our notions of caretaker and
ideal worker, finding their roots in the nineteenth-century ideology of
domesticity, from which we inherited the notion that the ideal worker
is someone who can devote his or her energy and time to wage work
without caretaking responsibilities.13 Williams argues that Title VII
should reach much discrimination against workers with significant
caretaking responsibilities and that property divided at divorce should
include post-divorce income.14
In their articles for this Symposium, Fineman and Williams make
additional contributions to the care movement. Fineman builds an
argument for adjusting the implicit social contract to support and
accommodate the needs of caretakers.15 Williams makes a number of
points about the ideology of domesticity, the intensive mothering
norms of the late twentieth century, the recent wars between
maternalists and equal parenting advocates, and gender as tradition.1 6
10. See Nancy Folbre, Children As Public Goods, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 86 (1994); NANCY
FOLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS? GENDER AND THE STRUCTURES OF CONSTRAINT (1994).
11. Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay for the Kids?, 563 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 194, 194 (1999).
12. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (1999) [hereinafter,
Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths]; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES
228-33 (1995) (arguing that the mother-child dyad should be regarded as the core family unit
and should be supported by the state).
13. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 31 (2000).
14. Id. at 121-22.
15. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1407-
08 (2001).
16. See Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care As Work,
2001]
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Section I of this Commentary addresses Fineman's contributions
to the care movement, and Section II comments on Williams's
contributions. Section III discusses some of the emerging feminist
arguments against the care movement.
I. FINEMAN
In her article for this Symposium, Martha Fineman builds a
powerful argument for public support of dependency. As Fineman
points out, those who care for dependents do productive labor
essential for the public good: caretaking labor reproduces society. 17
Society therefore owes caretakers a debt and should provide better
supports. And Fineman (like Williams)8 calls for changes in market
institutions to make wage work compatible with caretaking. 9
Fineman's argument is in the form of a challenge to the social
contract "that guides and gauges the relationship among individuals,
societal institutions, and the state. ' 20 This is not the "social contract"
of political theorists, but the real-world, unwritten but implicit and
widely-shared understanding of the respective roles of individuals,
families, parents, schools, churches, the state, employers, and other
institutions in the United States today; an understanding that makes
the current distribution of rights, obligations, and resources seem fair
and even natural. Despite sea changes in family organization-
particularly divorce rates near fifty percent and the entry of most
mothers into the wage labor market-Americans continue to expect
the family to care for dependents. 2' But even middle class families
lack the ability to care for dependents without increased support and
accommodation from government and employers. 22 And high rates of
child poverty after years of prosperity are stark evidence of the
seriousness of the problem for families at lower income levels.
Although Fineman's assertion that children are a public good is an
economic argument, she also challenges the present value system,
criticizing our focus on the Dow Jones Industrial Average as a
Gender As Tradition, 76 CH.L-KENT L. 1441, I444-45,1449-50,1452 (2W1).
17. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 1406.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See Fineman, supra note 15, at 1411-12.
20. Id. at 1405.
21. See id. at 1422-23.
22. See id. at 1430.
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barometer of national well-being while oblivious to shocking levels of
child poverty and increasing income inequality.23
In this Commentary on Fineman's contribution to this
Symposium, I make two points. First, I ask her to clarify whether she
believes caretakers should receive enough in subsidies to make wage
work optional. I suggest that we push for something like the French
system of supports, a system that requires parents to work for wages
if their families are to rise above poverty, but under which working
parents can pull their families out of poverty. Second, I add to her
challenge of the dominance of economic values in the United States
today by describing how the literature on human happiness supports
her position, as does the important work of Amartya Sen and Martha
Nussbaum on freedom as the opportunity to develop one's
capabilities as a human being.
A. Wage Work and Caretakers
Fineman is not explicit about the kinds of supports she would
provide for caretakers. Does she believe that caretakers should
receive enough in income supports, food stamps, health care,
subsidized housing, etc., so that they need not work for wages as well
as caretake? This is an important issue for several reasons. On a
pragmatic level, it is very difficult-nearly impossible-to imagine
that in the next twenty years we could create supports high enough to
keep families out of poverty without any working adult. Most
mothers, even mothers of infants, are in the wage-labor market
today.2 4 Voters are therefore unlikely to support policies that would
transfer enough resources to poor caretakers to bring their families
above the poverty line without wage work.
More importantly, wage work is of value to caretakers. If
mothers25 do not work while their children are small (or until the
youngest child is eighteen?), they spend years with no connection to
the wage labor market, and the wages of these women will be
depressed throughout their working lives. Further, wage work has
beneficial effects.26 Wage workers tend to be happier and to have
23. See id. at 1436.
24. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN
WOMEN, Fig. 4 (June 1998) (fifty-nine percent of mothers with a child under a year are working
for wages or looking for work, though many work part-time).
25. I assume that any policies along the lines described in text would be available to
caretakers regardless of their sex, but use "mothers" because caretakers are usually mothers.
26. See Peter B. Edelman, Promoting Family by Promoting Work: The Hole in Martha
2001]
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better self-esteem as well as the opportunity to develop their own
capabilities. 27 The poor tend to be more socially isolated than other
people, and work gives people the opportunity to connect with others
as well as to learn skills that are likely to make caretakers more
effective in all areas of life, including caretaking. In her recent book
telling the story of one woman's escape from domestic violence and
welfare (and analyzing various policy alternatives), Jody Raphael
describes the importance of work for such women:
In addition to providing the capacity for much-needed economic
independence, however, work provides other necessary ingredients
that help women escape from and stay free of violence. These
critical attributes of employment include instilling a sense of
personal worth and value, a sense of purpose and achievement, a
.capacity to contribute to the wider society, experience with and
control over social arrangements outside the household, and
independence from the control of others.28
For any poor, single parent, work offers these advantages, though
these attributes of work are particularly important for poor women in
violent relationships. Nearly one-third of women on welfare are or
have recently been in a violent relationship.29 It is true that racism
explains our insistence that married mothers should be full-time
homemakers and that poor, single mothers should work for wages.
But it is nevertheless true that poor families need the advantages that
come from a wage-earning adult in the household.
I believe that we should push for a system of supports similar to
those in France, where strong supports for caretakers create no
disincentive to work because by working, but only if they work,
parents earning low wages can pull their families out of poverty. In
France, families with children receive many supports from the state.
As a result, although child poverty rates are about equal in France
a'nd the United States prior to governmental supports (based on
parental income alone, about 24.7% of French children were poor in
1984-87 as compared to 23.3% of American children), after
governmental supports, only 5.7% of French children remained poor
whereas 21% of American children remained poor.30 Similarly,
Fineman's Doughnut, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 85 (2000).
27. See id. at 88-89.
2& See JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE 114 (2000) (citing Abigail J. Stewart,
Discovering the Meaning of Work, in THE EXPERIENCE AND MEANING OF WORK IN WOMENS'
LIVES 262 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. ed., 1990)).
29. See id. at 25.
30. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM POVERTY: WHAT THE
UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM FRANCE 6 (1996).
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although 24% of French adults and 20% of American adults were
poor based on wage income alone, only 8% of French adults were
poor after governmental supports whereas 16% of American adults
remained poor after considering such supports.3 Further, in the
United States, proportionally more poor adults are women than in
France. In the United States, 38% more women than men are poor,
whereas in France only 11% more women than men are poor.32
1. Supports for All Families
In France, many supports are available to all parents and
children regardless of income. Free nursery schools are available for
children (regardless of whether the mother works) from the time they
are toilet trained (about 2 years) until they enter first grade.
Parents who use private centers receive cash benefits and tax breaks.
When mothers of younger children work, government heavily
subsidizes placements in daycare centers.3
Daycare workers in France are well-trained and well-paid
relative to the United States. Indeed, because of the higher level of
teacher training, nursery quality surpasses that of American
preschools with lower teacher-child ratios.34 In 1991, salaries for
French daycare workers started at $14,153 per year, and these
workers also received free housing or a tax-free housing allowance. 35
The average yearly earnings for childcare workers in the United
31. Colin Hughes & Kerry McCuaig, When Mom Must Work: Family Day Care As a
Welfare-to-Work Option, Section 2, Table 1 (2000), at http://www.childcarecanada.org/
CPAGCCEF/momswelfare/two.html.
32. Karen Christopher et al., Gender Inequality in Poverty in Affluent Nations: The Role of
Single Motherhood and the State, paper 108 (2000), at http://www.jcpr.org/wp.
33. See BERGMANN, supra note 30, at 27-41. Subsidies for care of infants and toddlers vary
with income level. In 1991, a family with a monthly income under $681.00 and one child would
pay the equivalent of $4.15 per day for care of an infant or young toddler; such a family would
pay the equivalent of $3.38 per day per child for two children in such care. A family with a
monthly income of $1,286.00 would pay $7.68 and $6.45, respectively. A family with a monthly
income of $2,496.00 would pay $15.21 and $12.60. Id. at 40.
34. See id. at 31. In France, the ratio tends to be about 16 children to one adult. This
would be regarded as inadequate in the United States, where:
an adult-child ratio of 1:9 [is thought] to be crucial to providing high-quality care; U.S.
preschools abide by this finding. However, a group of American experts on day care
who observed French child-care facilities in 1989 concluded that, despite the larger
number of children per adult, the quality.., was as high as or higher than the best and
highest-cost American day-care centers. More systematic studies of teacher-child
interactions confirm this impression. One study concluded that teacher training in
France, which encourages teachers to carefully plan daily activities and constantly





States in 1998 was under $12,000.36 Thus, women working for wages
as caretakers are paid significantly more in France than in the United
States.
Perhaps as a result of the better pay for caretakers in the wage-
labor market, the gap between men's and women's pay is smaller in
France than in the United States. In the United States, full-time,
year-round wage-earning women earn an average of $0.75 for every
dollar earned by similar men, but full-time, year-round wage-earning
women in France earn about $0.81 for every $1.00 earned by such
men.
37
All education is free in France, from nursery school through
university. And "supervised recreational programs for school-age
children for the after-school hours, and during summers and school
vacations, subsidized by the government, are common. '38
Family allowances are available to all families with more than
one child under sixteen (or eighteen, depending on the child's
earnings from age sixteen to eighteen) and are not income tested.
The benefit varies only with the number of children, and in 1990 was
$91 per month for a family with two children and $207 a month for a
family with three children. In addition, every pregnant woman is
entitled to a new baby allowance each month from the third month of
pregnancy until the baby is three months old. In 1991, the new baby
allowance was $134 per month. For low- and medium-income
families, this allowance continues until the youngest child is three
years. 39
If parents do not live together, the government pays a minimum
child support payment each month and is responsible for collecting
child support from the noncustodial parent. In 1991, the Child
Support Assurance benefit was $66 per month per child; this benefit is
not means tested.40 Handicapped children receive an additional
allowance independent of family income.41 In 1991, it was $304 a
36. Robin Urevitch, All Things Considered: Child-care Workers Look to Unions to Help
Them Raise Pay and the Status of Their Profession (NPR All Things Considered radio
broadcast, Jan. 2, 2001), available at LEXIS, News Library, National Public Radio File.
37. See JONI SEAGER, THE STATE OF WOMEN IN THE WORLD ATLAS 68 (Penguin
Reference 2d ed. 1997).
38. See BERGMANN, supra note 30, at 28.
39. See id. at 58-61. All members of the European Community, even England, provide
family allowances. In England, the allowance is $46 per month for one child, $92 for two
children, and $138 for three children. See id. at 59.
40. See id. at 61-62.
41. See id. at 62.
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month for a child requiring constant help in daily activities and $164 a
month for a child needing less help.42 Income tax deductions for
children are also available and are about the same size as those in the
United States on a per child basis.43
Mothers receive sixteen weeks of paid maternity leave at the
birth of a first or second child and twenty-six weeks on the birth of a
third child."a The stipend is paid by the social security agency, and in
1991 "was 84% of the mother's base salary up to a maximum of
[$1,742 dollars] per month. '45 In France, all families are covered by
national health insurance. 46
2. Supports for Poor Families
Poor families with three or more children (and no new baby
allowance) in France are entitled to an additional family allowance.
In 1991 this benefit was $122 per month.4 7 For families of modest
means ($17,669 yearly income for family with one child), an
allowance of $57 is available for each child between the ages of six
and ten at the start of the school year.48 The single-parent subsistence
allowance ensures that total family income from wages, government
benefits, child support, etc., reaches at least a set minimum level if
there is a child under three in the family ($582 per month in 1991 for
a parent with one child, with an additional $146 per month for each
additional child).4 1 Substantial housing subsidies are also available to
families at very low income levels, though they decline sharply as
income rises. 0
These state-provided subsidies for child raising have two
important effects: First, by working, even at a minimum-wage job,
42. See id.
43. See id. at 68.
44. See id. at 46.
45. See id. (she is entitled to $192 a month if she had a job immediately before the
pregnancy or during it even though she no longer has the job).
46. See id. at 70. Although France has national health care, it spends a smaller portion
(9.9% in 1995) of its Gross Domestic Product on health care than does the United States (13.6%
of Gross Domestic Product spent on health care in 1995). In the United States, 15% of whites
lacked health insurance in 1997, 22% of African Americans, 34% of Hispanic Americans, and
21% of Asian Americans. See JAMES HEINTZ & NANCY FOLBRE, THE ULTIMATE FIELD
GUIDE TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 122, 132 (2000).
47. See BERGMANN, supra note 30, at 64.
4& See id. at 64-65.
49. See id. at 65-66. When she no longer has a child under three, the single parent may
qualify for additional assistance under the Minimum Income to Assist Job Entry Program. See
id. at 66-67.
50. See id. at 63.
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parents who work can pull their families out of poverty. Good
supports provide no disincentive to work in France, because families
remain poor unless parents work, but can rise above the poverty level
if parents work. Second, many of the supports needed by poor
families are either available to all families or to all but wealthy
families. Because these supports are available to all or most families,
they enjoy broad support.
3. Hours of Work
Finally, caretaking is made easier by the fact that the French, like
other Europeans, work significantly fewer hours per year than
Americans. American workers receive an average of only ten paid
vacation days a year.51 In Europe, including France, the norm is
twenty to twenty-seven days of paid vacation.5 1 In the United States,
full-time workers average 43.2 hours a week53 under unenforced laws
setting the maximum work week at forty hours.54 In France, a recent
law mandates a maximum work week of thirty-five hours (down from
thirty-nine hours with no reduction in pay).55 In 1997, American
workers worked an average of 1966 hours, compared to the French
who worked only 1656 hours. 56 Thus, the French worker works an
average of 5.98 fewer hours per week.
In her article for this Symposium, Joan Williams argues for
approaches to child poverty that do not focus only on the poor.5 7 An
51. Barbara Clements, Different Slant on Enjoying a European Vacation, NEWS TRIB., July
9, 2001, at C14.
52. Id.
53. Larry Williams & Mary Otto, Mild Unrest Marks Modern Labor Day: U.S. Workers See
Best, Worst of Times, DENV. POST, Sept. 6, 1999, at E-05.
54. Liz Pulliam, A Century of Stunning Progress for the American Worker, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1999, at C2.
55. See Anders Hayden, France's 35-Hour Work Week, 34 CANADIAN DIMENSION 8
(2000). The law was designed as a way to cut the unemployment rate, which has been very high
(though it is now steadily falling). Prior to the new law, unemployment was 12.5%. Although
there was some controversy about the legislation even among workers, some of who worried
that employers would merely require employees to do the same amount of work in a shorter
amount of time, "84 per cent of workers who had their hours reduced said that there were more
advantages than disadvantages, and 75 per cent said their quality of life had improved." Id.
Workers reported that they were likely to use the time to "spend more time with family and
children." Id. Employers have implemented the change in "diverse ways, such as: seven-hour
days, alternating four a. d fiveday weeks, additional days off on an annual basis-usually 22 or
23, and 'time savings accounts' for accumulation of long periods of leaves." Id. Many
workplace agreements "have gone beyond 35 to 32 hours or given individual workers the choice
of reducing their hours further." Id.
56. Elizabeth Olson, Americans Lead the World in Hours Worked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
1999, at C9.
57. See Williams, supra note 16, at 1454-55.
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approach patterned after the French model would fill this need and
encourage caretakers to work. Some adjustments would, of course,
be appropriate for the American context. For example, as Bergmann
points out in her book, vouchers would seem to be a better approach
to childcare in the United States than government-run daycare
centers.58 But vouchers must be generous enough to allow all parents,
regardless of income, to purchase quality care and to ensure that
daycare workers earn a living wage.
B. Human Happiness and Well-Being
One of the most evocative passages in Fineman's article is her
criticism of our obsession with the Dow Jones average and blindness
to the needs of poor children and other vulnerable human beings:
A focus on market well-being has supplanted more inclusive and
nuanced public assessments about national direction. The transfor-
mation in the focus of the public sphere is best captured by the way
in which the well-being of the nation is currently measured. The
Dow Jones Industrial Average is reported daily (even hourly on
public radio) as though this reflected our country's health and
wealth, an economic indicator substituting for other forms of
evaluation of national standing such as the equitableness of the
distribution of the wealth the society is producing or the well-being
of the most vulnerable of our citizens. We seem blinded in a revere
of self-satisfaction even as the position of our children and the
historically disadvantaged subgroups in society deteriorates both
from where they were a few decades ago and relative to the
positions of these groups in other industrialized democracies.59
From viewing both national conventions during the 2000 election, one
would assume that the key to human happiness is ever-increasing
GNP and that an ever-increasing GNP is the undisputed primary
concern of government. As Fineman notes, this fixation on economic
indicators to the exclusion of other measures of well-being is
obviously troubling for the poor.6°
It is not, however, only the needs of the poor that this fixation
ignores. It is the needs of all of us. Empirical work on wealth and
human happiness indicates that in any given society at any given time,
individuals who are wealthier tend to be happier.61 But these studies
58. See BERGMANN, supra note 30, at 130.
59. Fineman supra note 15, at 1436.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Richard A. Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness
of All?, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35, 35 (1995). The effect of income on happiness is,
however, limited after other factors have been taken into account. See id.
2001]
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also reveal that an increase in a society's wealth does not increase
reported happiness. 62 An analysis of happiness surveys in the United
States from 1946 to 1977 found no trend toward increased happiness
with rising prosperity.63 Indeed, data through 1994 reveals "no
improvement in happiness in the United States in over almost half a
century in which real GDP per capita more than doubled." 64
The experiences of Europe and Japan have been similar, and
that of Japan is particularly dramatic because income levels in Japan
in the aftermath of World War II were much lower than in Europe or
the United States. Japan experienced a five-fold increase in real per
capita income between 1958 and 1987, bringing Japan to a "living
level equal to about two-thirds that of the United States." 65 Whereas
at the start of this period, few homes contained washing machines,
refrigerators, televisions, and other durables, by the end of the period,
almost every household contained such items and sixty percent
owned cars.66 Yet "there was no improvement in mean subjective
well-being. ,,67
Higher incomes do not produce increased happiness "because
material aspirations increase with a society's income." 68  Indeed,
researchers find that "material norms and income increase, not only
in the same direction, but at the same rate. '69
Another set of happiness studies indicates that an individual's
pursuit of affluence and power are actually inconsistent with the
pursuit of happiness.70 Individuals who value extrinsic goals (e.g.,
power, wealth, fame, image) relative to intrinsic goals (e.g., personal
growth, competence, relatedness, community service, community)
experience lower levels of well-being.7, Intrinsic goals "can directly
satisfy basic psychological needs for autonomy, relatedness, and
competence. ' 72 Extrinsic goals "provide only indirect satisfaction of
62. See id. at 35-37.
63. See id. at 37.
64. Id. at 38 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 39 (citations omitted).
66. See id. at 39-40.
67. Id. at 40 (citations onitted).
68. Id. at 41.
69. Id.
70. See Richard M. Ryan et al., The American Dream in Russia: Extrinsic Applications and
Well-Being in Two Cultures, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1509, 1509 (1999).
71. See id.
72. Id. at 1510.
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these basic needs and may actually distract from or interfere with
their fulfillment." 73
Psychologists have reached conclusions much like those of
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Psychologists see three factors
as crucially important for human happiness: competence, autonomy,
and connection.7 4 Competence refers to an individual's ability to
develop her or his capabilities, whether building sand castles,
climbing mountains, learning to read and write, or learning to do a
job well. Autonomy refers to the ability to make decisions about
one's life, and connection refers to relationships with other people.
Wealth is not irrelevant to human happiness, but of limited
importance after basic needs are met. Income disparities are,
however, a problem in terms of human happiness, a point also
explored infra.
Sen defines substantive freedom as the individual's ability "to
lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value."75 From this
perceptive, "poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic
capabilities rather than merely as lowness of incomes. ' 76 Here is a
more detailed description from Nussbaum:
Central Human Functional Capabilities
(1) Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal
length ....
(2) Bodily health and integrity. Being able to have good health,
including reproductive health; being adequately nourished; being
able to have adequate shelter.
(3) Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place;
being able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual
assault, marital rape, and domestic violence; having opportunities
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
(4) Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses;
being able to imagine, to think, and to reason-and to do these
things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and cultivated by an
adequate education.... being able to use one's mind in ways
protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to
both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise;
being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid pain.
73. ld. France has substantially higher levels of national happiness than the United States.
See R. Ross Eshleman & Steven Stack, Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nation Study, 60 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 527, 532 (1998).
74. See Ryan et al., supra note 70, at 1510.
75. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 87 (1999).
76. Id.
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(5) Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and
persons outside ourselves; being able to love those who love and
care for us ....
(6) Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good
and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own
life ....
(7) Affiliation. Being able to live for and in relation to others, to
recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in
various forms of social interaction; being able to imagine the
situation of another and to have compassion for that situation;
having the capability for both justice and friendship... (b) Having
the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be
treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of
others ....
(8) Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in
relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
(9) Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational
activities.
(10) Control over one's environment. (a) Political: being able to
participate effectively in political choices that govern one's
life ... (b) Material: being able to hold property... ; having the
right to seek employment on an equal basis for others, having the
freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able
to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering
into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other
workers.
77
Thus, for Sen and Nussbaum, human capabilities encompass
competence, connection, and autonomy, which are the three factors
psychologists consider important for human happiness. It follows that
"the central goal of public planning should be the capabilities of
citizens to perform various important functions. '78 And the political
organization of a country should be judged by the extent to which the
people of the country are able to develop their capabilities. 9
Wealth is not wholly irrelevant to human well-being, of course.
But, as indicated earlier, it is of only limited importance. Indeed,
increased GNP that brings with it increased income inequality can
actually cause unhappiness. The American dream teaches that
anyone can achieve status, power, wealth, etc., through personal
effort. Failure is not, therefore, just bad luck or the result of social
77. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 41 (1999); see also Amartya Sen,
Capability and Well Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen
eds., 1993) (describing and discussing meaning of capabilities).
78. NUSSBAUM, supra note 77, at 42.
79. See id.
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class, but evidence of a defective moral character; those who fail are
morally culpable and "vulnerable to shame and guilt." 80 (The reality
is, of course, that one's success in life correlates most strongly, not
with individual attributes, but with the socioeconomic class into which
one is born.)81 Being poor in a poor village full of people who are
similarly poor is not damaging to the psyche. Being poor in a country
like ours with great disparities in income and a definition of virtue
synonymous with wealth is far more damaging, even if the poor
American is objectively better off than the poor villager.82
In addition, Sen emphasizes, "relative deprivation in terms of
incomes can yield absolute deprivation in terms of capabilities. 83 Part
of Sen's definition of capability is the ability to participate in the life
of the community (what the psychologists would refer to as the ability
to form connections with others).84 But a poor person in a rich
community may be unable to participate in the life of community
because she or he lacks Internet access or does not own a car. 85 Even
though the poor person in the rich community might be objectively
better off in terms of assets and income than a poor person in a poor
community, the poor person in the rich community will suffer a
capability deprivation not necessarily suffered by the poor person in
the poor community, who may be fully capable of participating in the
life of the community. 86
Seeing GNP growth as the undisputed primary concern of
government should be troubling to all of us. Without a doubt, this
goal is ideal from the perspective of business. But it is not, in and of
itself, a goal that fosters human well-being. Indeed, it can be
inconsistent with the attainment of the real human needs of
connection and competence. As noted above, people who pursue
affluence and power are less happy than those who pursue goals that
directly lead to competence and connections with others.
Further, increasing wealth for some leads to increased income
disparities, as has been the case in the United States in recent
decades,87 and brings with it problems in all three areas (connection,
80. JEROME KAGAN, THREE SEDUCTIVE IDEAS 141 (1998).
81. See id. at 147-49.
82. See id. at 175-76.
83. SEN, supra note 75, at 89.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 89-90.
87. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 1999 (P60-269), at xii tbl.C (2000).
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autonomy, and capability) for the poor. Poverty places great, often
unbearable, stress on human relationships. Those who live in poor
neighborhoods tend to have fewer connections to formal and
informal social supports, including churches, schools, and civic and
political organizations.88 The poor have less autonomy because they
have less control than others over where the live, how they get from
one place to another, what schools they or their children attend, etc.
The poor also have less ability to develop their competence, since
they tend to go to inadequate schools and, as adults, face jobs that are
likely to be tedious and numbing rather than challenging.
In addition, income inequalities are associated with poor health
for all members of a society, not just the poor. Social scientists and
medical researchers studying the health of populations report that it is
not the richest countries that have the best health, but those with the
smallest inequalities between the rich and the poor.89 Even within a
country such as the United States, people living in states with lower
levels of income inequality are healthier than those in states with
higher levels of income inequality. 90 And it is not simply the poor
who have poorer health when income disparities are pronounced. In
less equal societies the middle class is less healthy than the middle
class in more equal societies (even at equal income levels).91 In a
society with high levels of disparities, we all suffer considerable strain.
Fineman is right in questioning the Dow Jones average as a
barometer of our well-being.
My comments on Fineman ask her to clarify her argument with
respect to whether she would transfer sufficient supports to
caretakers to enable them to support their children above the poverty
line without engaging in wage work. For both pragmatic political
reasons and for the well-being of caretakers themselves (and hence
their children), we should follow the French pattern and provide
8& See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 296-318 (2000).
89. See, e.g., Norman Daniels et al., Justice Is Good for Our Health, in IS INEQUALITY BAD
FOR OUR HEALTH 3, 9-11 (Norman Daniels et al. eds., 2000) (once per capita gross domestic
product reaches a minimum level of $8,000 to $10,000). On the interrelationship of equality and
health, see generally RICHARD G. WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES: THE AFFLICTIONS OF
INEQUALITY (1996); 1 THE SOCIETY AND POPULATION HEALTH READER: INCOME
INEQTI AND ELT 1^ (1chiTTo Ka.... ; et a! ds., 1999) . 'T9h, 1 I IE -1. AND
POPULATION HEALTH READER: A STATE PERSPECTIVE (Alvin R. Tarlov & F. St. Peter eds.,
2000).
90. See WILKINSON, supra note 89, at 78-79; Richard G. Wilkinson, Putting the Picture
Together: Prosperity, Redistribution, Health, and Welfare, in SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH 256, 258-59 (Michael Marmot & Richard G. Wilkinson eds., 1999).
91. See Daniels et al., supra note 89, at 3.
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supports such that, when combined with wage work, working parents
can pull their families out of poverty.
II. WILLIAMS
Williams focuses on the ideological framework of domesticity
and its links to gender norms requiring that women be selfless
nurturers and that men be breadwinners. This is an important
contribution. Feminists have focused too much on the social
pressures on women and too little on the social pressures on men.
Williams is right in saying: "[G]ender is not just a power differential
between men and women." 92 In my comments on Williams's article, I
break my discussion into four major topics: (1) the battle between
maternalists and equal parenting feminists; (2) Williams's criticisms of
relational and dominance feminism; (3) gender as tradition; and (4)
using Title VII to require employers to accommodate caretakers.
A. Maternalists v. Equal Parenting Feminists
Much of Williams's first section is an insightful social
commentary on norms of domesticity in twentieth-century America.
Women's reproductive labor has been so spiritualized that it is
difficult to see it as either reproductive or labor.93 The home has
become increasingly child centered, with ever-increasing demands for
intensive mothering as more and more mothers work for wages
outside the home.94 Under intensive mothering norms, mothers are
caught in double binds with respect to their performance as mothers
and workers, and women who are not mothers understandably resent
the notion that this construct is true womanhood. 95
In this same section, Williams discusses the wars between
maternalist and equal parenting feminists. She begins her discussion
of the wars with a "first important point, constantly forgotten":
whether one is a maternalist or an equal parenting advocate depends
on personal experience. According to Williams,
[ilf a woman truly loves the mothering role and feels no desire to
give up part of it, or has no partner and wants none, she will be a
maternalist. In sharp contrast, a woman who has successfully
shared family work with a partner in a way she feels has enriched
92. Williams, supra note 16, at 1470.
93. See id. at 1446.
94. See id. at 1447-52.
95. See id. at 1450-51.
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both her family and her work life will feel equally [committed] to
ideals of equal parenting.9 6
This may often be true. Maybe it is true for every other woman
on earth, but it is not true for me. And I suspect that it is not actually
true for many equal parenting advocates either. In Williams's
taxonomy, I am a maternalist. I have been skeptical of the likelihood
of men actually engaging in equal parenting (i.e., being as likely to
actually carry the child in their minds as mothers)97 and have
advocated a presumption that the mother, if fit, should decide what
custody arrangement would be best for the child.98
My maternalism cannot, however, be traced to a love of my
mothering role and an absence of any desire to give it up. I am not a
mother. I am the oldest of six children and did an enormous amount
of childcare while growing up. I was always ambivalent about having
children. In the end, I never had them, for many reasons. But I do
love children. When I wrote the article arguing a maternal
presumption for custody, I had been living with a sister and her
children for some years, the youngest of whom is like a daughter to
me. But I have been more like a father than a mother to her. I
appreciate the vast difference between the care I have given and the
care her mother has given. I believe that my experiences are relevant
to my position in this battle, but that it is my experience in a father-
like role that has made me appreciate the work mothers do. I also
believe that most fathers, being men, tend not to see the full extent of
the difference between what they do and what their children's
mothers do on many different levels, particularly the emotional.
I suspect that many equal parenting feminists know that in most
families, including their own, fathers and mothers do not play
comparable roles in their children's lives. But they believe that the
only way to achieve equality between women and men is for men to
be equally responsible for caretaking. They are, therefore, strongly
committed to increasing equality between mothers and fathers over
time, and do see some progress: their partners are more involved than
their fathers were. I suspect that many use the rhetoric of equality as
the best way to support their commitment to equal parenting in the
long term, though most have experienced its impossibility in the short
term of their own lives. Others may consciously believe that what
96. Id. at 1453.
97. See generally Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 15
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 202-03 (1992).
98. See id. at 203-17.
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they have achieved is equality (no matter how unequal) because they,
like many of the couples in Arlie Hochschild's study, believe in
equality and therefore regard their parenting roles as equal regardless
of reality.99
I am also somewhat skeptical of Williams's solution to the war
between equal parenting advocates and maternalists: craft all
proposals to appeal to both maternalists and equal parenting
feminists. Often it is possible to do so, at least theoretically. Both
maternalist feminists and equal parenting feminists might agree, for
example, to seek paid parental leave incorporated into
unemployment insurance. But what if it might be possible to enact
paid maternity leave but impossible-at least in the near future-to
enact paid parental leave? In fact, the country that was first to
mandate paid parental leave by law (Sweden) started with paid
maternity leave.1°° It may well be that the quickest way to get the
paid parental leave that both maternalists and equal parenting
advocates could support would be to start with a maternalist policy:
paid maternity leave.
Similarly, both maternalists and advocates of equal parenting
can, in the abstract, support custody standards at divorce that favor
the primary caretaker. But reality is that (1) a primary caretaker
standard is biased against mothers in application because judges tend
to be too impressed by any caretaking by fathers; (2) even when
fathers get custody of children after the divorce, the primary
caretaker often continues to be, not the father, but another woman
(typically the father's new wife or girlfriend); and (3) women are not
fungible (i.e., most stepmothers have weaker ties to children than the
children's mothers).10l In the real world, it does not seem possible to
fashion a standard that is neither biased against mothers nor
maternalist.
99. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION
AT HOME? 33-58 (1989).
100. See Arielle Horman Grill, The Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the United States
Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based on the Swedish Model?, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 373, 396-97
(1996); Scott A. Caplan-Cotenoff, Parental Leave: The Need for a National Policy to Foster
Sexual Equality, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 71, 93-94 (1987).
101. See Becker, supra note 97, at 175-83. On stepmothers, see also ANNE CASE ET AL.,
How HUNGRY IS THE SELFISH GENE (2000), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-rpds/
macarthur/gene2000.PDF (reporting on an empirical study that shows more money is spent on
food in families with mothers rather than stepmothers).
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B. Williams's Criticisms of Relational Feminism and Dominance
Feminism
Williams criticizes relational feminism as essentialist (i.e., as
assuming that all women are identical to each other and that all men
are different). Williams directs this criticism at Robin West:
A decade of antiessentialist critique has not dislodged different-
voice feminism. Indeed, the critique has accomplished remarkably
little. Early different-voice articles noted that Carol Gilligan's
descriptions were "controversial," and proceeded to use them
anyway; more recent scholarly work acknowledges antiessentialist
critiques but then proceeds to use precisely the same picture of
women as selfless, all-giving, and focused on care. Thus Robin
West acknowledges the antiessentialist critique but then goes right
on to talk about "women." This only serves to fuel objections that
she overlooks many women who do not feel described by relational
feminists' description of women. 102
Two questions jump to my mind when reading this passage. First,
Williams uses the word "women" repeatedly throughout her
contribution to this Symposium. If she can use it without being
essentialist, why cannot Robin West? Indeed, how can Robin West
work at all as a feminist if she cannot use the word "women"?
Second, in Caring for Justice, West responds to the anti-
essentialist critique thoughtfully and in great detail, explaining why it
is important to acknowledge the "genesis of the ethic [of care] in
women's lives" even as we argue for applying it (as West does in her
book) broadly to social problems. 103 Williams agrees that women
have traditionally been assigned nurturing and caretaking roles (this
is, after all, part of her core claim about the ideology of
domesticity).104 Williams would not, therefore, seem to disagree that
the ethic of care can be traced to women's lives via women's
traditional roles. In the Caring for Justice passage Williams cites,
West clearly states that she believes neither that all men are
essentially different from all women nor that all women are identical:
"there are caring men and uncaring women."'105 Why does Williams
not discuss West's response of the essentialist critique and explain
why she considers West's response inadequate?
102. Williams, supra note 16, at 1468 (citations omitted).
103. WEST, supra note 1, at 19-20.
104. See Williams, supra note 16, at 1444-45.
105. WEST, supra note 1, at 18.
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I also had difficulty with Williams's discussion of dominance
feminism in her contribution to this Symposium. She criticizes
dominance feminism for its reliance on "false consciousness":
[T]he only rhetoric dominance feminism offers for understanding
"choice" . . . is "false consciousness." "False consciousness"
presents several problems. First, it is infuriatingly condescending;
can you imagine a trade book that actually inspired women to think
of themselves as responding to social mandates rather than making
authentic choices by telling them they suffered from "false
consciousness"? As feminist jurisprudence seeks a broader
audience than academic lawyers, the false consciousness language
becomes less useful.
False consciousness is analytically flawed as well, for it implies
that the analyst has a bird's-eye view from outside the gender
system she is describing, and is delivering the Truth to the poor,
trapped inhabitants. Not only is this condescending, it will cause
feminists to miss the extent to which we all are operating within the
gender system we seek to contest, which is a crucial insight if we are
to avoid a new round of sameness/difference debates.1°6
Catharine MacKinnon never uses the term "false consciousness"; she
consciously avoids it. Williams does not cite any examples of
dominance feminists who actually do. It is, of course, likely that some
of the hundreds, if not thousands, of feminists who have engaged in
dominance analysis (following MacKinnon) use the term "false
consciousness." But given MacKinnon's avoidance of it, there is no
reason to identify its use as a unique problem for dominance
feminism.
All feminists have some vision of potential change in women's
status and consciousness. Williams herself has such a vision: a
weakened gender system in which there is more equality between
women and men than there is today and in which women would face
fewer constraints and be able to make different decisions.' °7 In
Williams's ideal world, the consciousness of men as well as that of
women would change with respect to internalized norms of gender
identity. °8
C. Men under Pressure, Gender As Tradition
Throughout her article, Williams stresses that gender is more
than men's power over women; it is tradition-a set of social norms
106. Williams, supra note 16, at 1470.
107. See id. at 1493.
108. See id. at 1478-79.
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and expectations pressuring men as well as women to conform to
gender stereotypes. 1 9 While women are harmed by becoming giving
selves, men are harmed by losing the ability to know what they feel.
Women as mothers and workers face impossible double binds. But
men are under great pressure both internally (norms of masculinity
requiring that men be breadwinners) and externally (employer
resistance to time off for parenting for men) to make wage work a
higher priority than caretaking in their lives. This is an important
point. Feminists have focused too much attention on pressures under
which women operate and too little on the pressures under which
men operate. We need to see masculinity as well as femininity as
problematic.
But it is also important to recognize the very real conflicts of
interest between women and men. Even after taking into account the
fact that fathers work more hours in the wage labor market, in
families in which mothers also work for wages, mothers work more
hours altogether-when wage and care work are combined-than do
men. Recall Arlie Hochschild's families in Second Shift in which the
women put in an extra month of work a year when hours of wage and
care work are combined. 110 This difference is not attributable to
pressures on men to put breadwinning first, but to men's preference
for personal leisure over caretaking, fairness, justice, and equality.
Indeed, it is generally true that the social system that pressures
men to be masculine and women to be feminine does not operate in
parallel ways for women and men, as the "gender as tradition"
approach seems to suggest. More helpful than Pierre Bourdieu and
Judith Butler, I suggest, are contemporary American scholars writing
in the new field of masculinities, which closely examines both the
pressures on men to conform to social norms and what men get as a
pay off: more power than women, including a month of extra leisure a
year in families with two wage earners. Men conform in part to enjoy
the advantages of being male."'
109. See generally id.
110. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 99, at 254.
111. See, e.g., ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELLING OUR PATRIAR-
CHAL LEGACY (1997); MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY
(1997); MICHAEL KAUFMAN, CRACKING THE ARMOUR: POWER, PAIN AND THE LIVES OF MEN
(1993); RETHINKING MASCULINITY: PHILOSPHICAL EXPLORATIONS IN LIGHT OF FEMINISM
(Larry May et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996); MEN AND INTIMACY: PERSONAL ACCOUNTS EXPLORING
THE DILEMMAS OF MODERN MALE SEXUALITY (Franklin Abbott ed., 1990); BEYOND
PATRIARCHY: ESSAYS BY MEN ON PLEASURE, POWER, AND CHANGE (Michael Kaufman ed.,
1987).
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D. Using Title VII to Force Employers to Accommodate Working
Parents
In her contribution to this Symposium, Williams does not
describe the details of how she would move toward a world in which
employers provided greater accommodation of caretaker workers. In
her book, however, she suggests a litigation drive to expand the
meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII to include policies
premised on ideal workers without caretaker responsibilities."'
We need to face the fact that Title VII is an empty remedy apart
from the most extreme cases. We need another way to resolve
discrimination complaints; the federal courts are simply unwilling to
do so. Today, Title VII plaintiffs routinely lose on motions for
summary judgment, with the result that the law of discrimination is
becoming more and more hostile to plaintiffs. The fate of pregnancy
discrimination claims is but one illustration of this broad phenomena.
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that Title VII's prohibition on
sex discrimination did not include distinctions based on pregnancy."3
Women were shocked and outraged. Congress responded with the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), which amended
Title VII to provide that sex discrimination includes discrimination:
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes... as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability to work or inability to work.114
Although the PDA remains formal law,115 it is increasingly
difficult for a plaintiff to win a pregnancy discrimination case.
Consider, for example, Troupe v. May Department Stores Co."6
Kimberly Troupe had worked as a sales person at Lord & Taylor for
several years without any problem before she became pregnant.' 7
She had terrible morning sickness during her pregnancy and was
often late or early to leave, even after cutting her hours from full-time
to half-time (1:00 P.M. to 5:00 P.M.).118 After a warning, she was
112. See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 104-10.
113. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134 (1976).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
115. See id.; § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
116. 20 F.3d 734 (1994).




placed on probation, but the problem continued. ' 9 On the day before
she was to start her maternity leave, her supervisor (as they made
their way to the meeting at which Troupe was fired) told Troupe that
she was being fired because she (the supervisor) did not believe that
Troupe would return to work following her leave.1 20 When Troupe
sued, arguing that the employer had discriminated on the basis of sex
in violation of the PDA, the employer argued that she was fired for
arriving late and leaving early.121
The district court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that Troupe had not demonstrated that a man about to go on
a medical leave would not have been fired. 122 Troupe is by no means
unique, and has been followed by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in a case finding no discrimination when an employer, forced
to lay off one secretary, laid off the unmarried African American
woman on maternity leave rather than the secretary with the least
seniority or the lowest job evaluations. 23 In that case, there was a
trial, but increasing numbers of dismissals of complaints on summary
judgment result in substantive law that is ever more hostile to
plaintiffs.124
Thus, despite the PDA, pregnant women can be fired for being
the one on leave when a reduction in force is necessary or being late
for work because of morning sickness. 2' It is also difficult for women
to win on claims that they were discriminated against for being new
mothers. 26 Indeed, it is becoming difficult for plaintiffs to win in
discrimination cases of any kind, except on the most extreme facts. 27
119. See id.
120. See id. at 736.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 737-38.
123. See In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997).
124. See id.
125. See Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 78-82
(1997); Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions: Richard
Posner's Pragmatism and Pregnancy Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REV. 193 (1994); MARY
BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (2d ed. 2001).
126. See Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of Martin
Marietta, 44 VILL. L. REV. 337 (1999).
127. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121
(1998) (describing cases holding that de minimis discrimination is not actionable under Title
VII, with a high standard for de minimis); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (discussing difficulties for
plaintiffs under the ADA); Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why
Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better
Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505 (2000).
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Over the last thirty years, trials of any kind have become
increasingly rare in federal court civil suits as increasing numbers of
cases are dismissed on motions for summary judgment. This trend
was already visible at the district court level by the mid-1980s, but was
strengthened by three cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1985.128
Although none of these cases involved a civil rights or employment
discrimination issue, they have been interpreted by the lower federal
courts as changing the standard for summary judgment in all kinds of
cases, including those arising under Title VII.129
Paul Mollica conducted a study examining ten volumes of the
Federal Reporter from 1973 and ten volumes from 1997-98. He found
a dramatic difference in the standard for summary judgment between
these dates. In 1973, most appeals were from trials. In the cases in
which the trial court had granted summary judgment, the reversal
rate on appeal was 45.5%.130 In 1973, federal appellate courts showed:
[E]xtreme vigilance against treading on contested fact issues or
mixed questions of law and fact-even arguable ones-reversing
them for evidentiary hearings. Only a modest proffer by the non-
movant was enough to demonstrate the necessity of a trial. This
was especially true in cases applying indeterminate legal standards,
such as reasonableness....
With only one exception [a defamation case], state-of-mind issues
(such as intent and malice) did not terminate in summary judgment
in the sample cases. 31
In the 1997-98 sample, in contrast, most appeals were from
grants of summary judgment, not trials.
It has become common to evaluate such legal standards as intent
and reasonableness on summary judgment-to evaluate, on
occasion, even issues of credibility-and to default non-movants
under Rule 56....
The reach of summary judgment... is especially pernicious in the
field of employment discrimination law, where the ultimate issue in
most cases is whether the employer (or, more pointedly, its agent)
intended to discriminate on the basis of a protected
classification....
12& See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(antitrust action); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (libel action); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (wrongful death action).
129. See Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 141,
141-70 (2000).
130. See id. at 147 (citing William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal
Summary Judgment Rule, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1977)).
131. Id. at 147-49.
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In a fair number of the employment cases, the summary judgment
went to the heart of the employer's alleged discriminatory intent.
A few cases found that plaintiffs failed to prove even a prima facie
case of discrimination. A larger number of decisions affirmed
summary judgment by holding that the plaintiff could not establish
discriminatory intent, either directly or indirectly. 132
The pressure on lower federal courts to use summary judgment
to eliminate Title VII cases from their dockets has increased
dramatically in the 1990s as the number of employment discrim-
ination cases filed has gone through the roof. In the year ending
December 13, 1990, 8290 employment discrimination cases were
filed. 133 Less than a decade later, in the year ending March 31, 1997,
the number filed was 23,547.1m4 These numbers are high enough to
overwhelm the federal courts and create great pressure on district
courts to dispose of employment discrimination claims on motions for
summary judgment.
As increasing numbers of Title VII cases are decided on
summary judgment, it is likely to become ever harder for plaintiffs to
prevail. Troupe, for example, held that as a matter of law, a plaintiff
cannot survive summary judgment on a pregnancy discrimination
claim when the employer alleges that she was fired for absenteeism
even if she can show that her supervisor said she was being fired
because she was not expected to return from maternity leave.13 5 Over
time, as more and more cases are decided by summary judgment in
order to control dockets and avoid trials, it will become more and
more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.
With the scope of Title VII and other discrimination statutes
shrinking for these reasons, it is not even remotely possible that the
federal courts would consider expanding Title VII's scope to reach
claims that employers discriminate when they structure jobs for ideal
workers without caretaking responsibilities. Rather than arguing to
judges for expanding the reach of Title VII, we need to think about
an alternative forum for enforcing antidiscrimination laws in general;
federal judges are simply not interested. We should also consider a
set of clear rules protecting pregnant workers and caretakers, rules
that would not require convincing judges that discrimination against
132. Id. at 167-69.
133. See White, supra note 127, at 1124 n.14.
134. See id. Paul Mollica reports that in 1973, 8.5% of pending federal civil cases resulted in
a trial, for a total of 8,297 civil trials. In 1999, 2.3% of pending federal civil cases resulted in a
trial, for a total of 6,228 civil trials in a year. See Mollica, supra note 129, at 141.
135. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (1994).
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them is sex discrimination. European Union law is far ahead of us on
these points and could serve as a model with respect to specific
rules.1
36
In my comments on Williams, I have suggested that her view of
maternalists and equal parenting advocates may be insufficiently
nuanced both with respect to the background leading a feminist to be
one or the other and with respect to the ability to avoid the conflict by
advocating policies that appeal to both camps. I have also noted
weaknesses in her criticisms of relational and dominance feminists
(West and MacKinnon) as well as in her suggestion that we should
regard gender norms as tradition pressuring both women and men to
conform. Finally, I have suggested that rather than expanding Title
VII to reach discrimination against workers who caretake, we need to
start thinking about an alternative (to the federal courts) forum for
resolution of such disputes as well as develop a set of bright-line rules
protecting workers who caretake.
III. A RADICAL ATTACK ON CARETAKING
In her opening paragraphs, Fineman describes an emerging
"radical attack on any existing notion that there is some collective
responsibility for children and other dependent persons.1'3 7 She also
notes with surprise that "some of today's extreme rhetoric extolling
private rather than public responsibility for dependency has come
from self-identified feminist legal scholars and scholars otherwise
aligning themselves with progressive positions."'138  In addition,
Fineman reports that "[s]ome are led to a privatizing position through
the logic of economic analysis with its emphasis on efficiency and
utility.1' 39 Fineman does not, however, respond in detail to such
radical attacks; when she submitted her contribution to this
136. In Europe, for example, it is illegal for an employer to fire an employee during
pregnancy or maternity leave for any pregnancy-related reasons, including inability to work or
being on maternity leave; thus, both Troupe and Carnegie Associates would have been decided
differently in Europe. There is no need to find a similarly situated man. See Brown v. Rentokil,
Ltd., E.C.R. 1-4185, 4222-23 (1998) (holding that under European Union law, an employer
cannot fire an employee during pregnancy or maternity leave for any reason connected to
pregnancy, such as inability to do the job because of pregnancy-related disability). European
law also requires that part-time workers receive equal pay and benefits on a pro rata basis (i.e.,
in proportion to the hours worked). See EVELYN ELLIS, EC SEX EQUALITY LAW 112-19 (2d
ed. 1998) (discussing cases).
137. Fineman, supra note 15, at 1403.
138. Id. at 1403-04.
139. Id. at 1404.
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Symposium, there was as yet no such attack in print.'14 One has,
however, just been published by Katherine Franke in the Columbia
Law Review.141 In the remainder of this Commentary, I describe and
then comment on Franke's arguments.
A. The Call
In her article, Franke criticizes feminism for seeing "sexuality as
[only] dependency and danger.11 42 According to Franke,
[L]egal feminism has, by and large, reduced questions of sexuality
to two principal concerns for women: dependency, and the
responsibilities that motherhood entails, and danger, such as sexual
harassment, rape, incest, and domestic violence. This concentration
on the elimination of sexual danger and dependency for women
risks making "women's actual experience with pleasure invisible,
overstat[ing] danger until it monopolizes the entire frame, positions
women solely as victims, and fails to empower our movement with
women's curiosity, desire, adventure, and success. 143
The heart of Franke's article is a call for feminists to focus on
women's sexual pleasure, a focus she sees as incompatible with, or at
least threatened by, feminist arguments for support and accom-
modation of caretakers. She begins her section on "The Repronor-
mativity of Motherhood" with this paragraph:
Motherhood and its implications figure centrally in virtually all
feminist agendas. However, for much of the first and second wave
legal feminism, issues of gender collapse quite quickly into the
normative significance of our roles as mothers. Grounding feminist
legal theory in object relations theory and demanding that women's
participation in the wage labor market be compatible with our
responsibilities as mothers are only two salient examples of how the
legal feminist frame tends to collapse women's identity into
motherhood. The centrality, presumption, and inevitability of our
responsibility for children remain a starting point for many, if not
most, legal feminists.'"
140. Id. at 1404 n.3 (noting that such opinions were expressed "by several participants at the
'Uncomfortable Conversation' panel discussions on 'Children: Public Good or Personal
Responsibility?' sponsored by the Feminism and Legal Theory Project and held on November
J9 and 20, 1.991, at %...flklell L.aW 3LOl ).1lU .
141. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COL. L. REV. 181 (2001).
142- Id. at 208.
143. Id. at 182 (quoting Carol S. Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade After the
Barnard Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289, 290 (1993)).
144. Id. at 183.
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Franke makes a number of points in discussing the repronor-
mativity of motherhood:
" Feminists have not paid enough "theoretical attention" to the
"complex ways in which reproduction is incentivized and
subsidized in ways that may bear on the life choices women
face. 145
* Feminists need to "reconceptualize procreation as a cultural
preference rather than a biological imperative, and then
explore ways in which to lessen or at least modify the demand
to conform to that preference. '146
* We "must go beyond the mere revaluation of women's
reproductive labor such that the maternalization of female
identity remains intact.' 1 47
* Commodification of dependency work is dangerous: "our best
strategy cannot lie in creative efforts to commodify the domain
of sexuality that is the surplus above mere procreation, for it
may be that its greatest value lies precisely in its excess. 1 48
* To Fineman's argument that raising children is society-
preserving work creating a social debt to mothers, Franke
responds:
* Consumption also reproduces society and cannot be
distinguished from production. Indeed, SKYY Vodka's
marketing campaign targeted at the gay community was an
occasion of celebration by the community, evidence that it
had "achieved a level of social visibility, acceptance, and
presence.'"149 And community identity can be
strengthened through consumptive acts, as illustrated by
MasterCard's use of Martina Navratilova to market
rainbow credit cards to the gay and lesbian community,
promoting "the idea that personal consumption is an
effective mode of political participation. '" 150
" Mothers often have children for selfish rather than
altruistic reasons, such as "'because they love them or the
idea of them, to keep a marriage together, to meet social,
spousal, or parental expectations, to experience pregnancy,
or to pass on the family name, genes or silver.""51
145. Id. at 184.
146. Id. at 185.
147. Id. at 187.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 189.
150. Id. at 188-90 (quoting ALEXANDER CHASIN, SELLING OUT: THE GAY AND LESBIAN
MOVEMENT GOES TO MARKET 198-99 (2000)).
151. Id. at 190 (quoting Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 15, 48 (1992)). It should be noted that having children because one loves them
is altruistic in economic terms. From an economic perspective, "parents are being 'altruistic if
all they obtain [by] doing something for others is the pleasure of making those others happy."'
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" Parents are given a degree of control over child rearing-
such as being able to decide to home school their children
to avoid dominant public values such as "tolerance,
equality, and humanity" 152 - inconsistent with viewing
children as a public good.
* Parenting "has become, in many regards, as much or more
about consumption than production," witness parents'
need to buy "Pokemon accessories, My Little Pony dolls,
Barbies, fancy sneakers,' 15 3 etc. It is unfair to require
taxpayers to pay for consumer goods in a consumerist
culture just because parents want to give things to their
children.5 4
* The need for a new generation of workers can be met by
immigration. Our preference for "natalist solutions"
(raising our own children) over immigration "have often
taken the form of loosely-veiled racism, xenophobia, or
decolonization." 155  Indeed, our immigration policy has
consistently rested on racist underpinnings. 15 6 Some of the
French supports for working parents were enacted at the
time immigration laws were tightened and supported by
nationalist rhetoric.1 57
0 Reproduction by women of color has been "structurally
discouraged, if not prohibited.' ' 58  Despite the "structural
disincentives to reproduce, women of color are more likely
than white women to have children."'1 9 Franke asks: "Might
there be any grounds upon which virtually universal
motherhood by Latinas would garner critical attention from
critical race feminists? According to what theory of well-being,
community, and flourishing would a cultural justification or
explanation for women of color's overwhelming reproduction
be legitimate?"'160
Franke closes her section on the "repronormativity of
motherhood" by carefully stating that "feminists should not abandon
a concern for the role of reproduction and mothering in women's
lives.' 6' She repeats her call to feminists to question mothering:
Andrew Hacker, The Case Against Kids, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 30, 2000, at 14 (quoting
economists Alessandro Cigno and Furio Rosati in THE ECONOMICS OF RECIPROCITY, GIVING,
AND ALTRUISM (Louis-Andr6 G6rard-Varet et at. eds., 2000)).
152. Franke, supra note 141, at 191-92.
153. Id. at 192.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 194.
156. See id. at 195.
157. See id. at 194.
158. Id. at 195-96.
159. Id. at 196.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 197.
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[W]e could stand to pay closer attention to the taken-for-
grantedness of motherhood in feminist legal theory. What is our
stake in treating motherhood as a social position and a set of both
expectations and entitlements not worthy of the level of
interrogation we have visited on other fundamental aspects of
women's lives? 162
B. Responses
1. Linking Reproduction As Dependency and Sex As Danger
The linkage Franke sees between reproduction as dependency
and sex as danger strikes me as nonexistent. I am all for more
emphasis on women's right to sexual pleasure, and have written and
raised questions about this issue. 63 But I would not look to lawyers
for a theory of female sexual pleasure. Law solves problems,
redresses harms, redistributes income.164 Given the purpose of law,
the focus of legal feminism on sex has appropriately involved sexual
harms.
More fundamentally, reproduction as dependency is not a
phenomenon in anyway parallel to sex as danger. Sex is dangerous
because heterosexual male sexuality is so often predatory. Sex is
dangerous because so often women are forced to have sex or are so
situated (as in a marriage with children) that they feel they cannot say
no to unwanted sex.
Reproduction involves dependency for mothers because we live
in a capitalist society in which income is required to live and in which
children are not allowed to engage in significant amounts of wage
labor. Raising children requires resources and limits the mother's
ability to earn wages.
True, a mother with children is likely routinely to have undesired
sex with her husband because of her children's dependency on his
wages. But public supports for working parents, like those in France
(and as under Williams' proposed sharing of income after divorce),165
would increase the mother's ability to say no and still be able to care
for her children. Until women can say "no" when they do not want
162. Id.
163. See Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
165, 189-202 (1998); Becker, supra note 6, at 50-51 (identifying the value of female sexual
agency as one of four key values of relational feminism); MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 181 (1st ed. 1994); MARY BECKER ET AL., supra
note 125, at 249-50.
164. See WEST, supra note 1, at 94-95, 174-78.
165. See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 124-31.
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sex, women will have difficulty being free sexual subjects seeking
their own pleasure. Unwanted sex teaches one to be somewhere else
(other than in one's body during sex) and that distancing, if repeated
often enough, makes it difficult to be present when one wants sexual
pleasure or thinks about wanting sexual pleasure. 166 Increasing
supports for and accommodation of mothering should increase
women's sexual agency.
Franke argues that women are under too much pressure, ignored
by feminists, to be mothers. (She sees structural disincentives to
mothering only for women of color.) I agree entirely with the limited
point that women face social pressures to be mothers and that
anything that would ease such social pressure would improve
women's well-being, provided that it does not increase the
disincentives to mothering. Although Franke totally misses this
reality, all women are under tremendous pressure not to be mothers
as well as to be mothers.
As Marilyn Frye pointed out in a classic essay published nearly
twenty years ago, to say that women (or any group) is oppressed is to
say that women are "caught between or among forces and barriers
which are so related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or
prevent the thing's motion or movability.' 16 7 According to Frye,
"[o]ne of the most characteristic and ubiquitous features of the world
as experienced by oppressed people is the double bind-situations in
which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to
penalty, censure or deprivation."'168
Whether to be a mother is one such double bind. If you decide
not to be a mother, some people will regard you as not a "real"
woman. But if you do become a mother, you are likely to be seen as
essentially a mother. This is particularly damaging in the workforce,
where being a mother is incompatible with being an ideal worker, as
Joan Williams so aptly terms it.169 But this is only the tip of the
iceberg with respect to disincentives to mother. Mothers earn less
money than other workers, even after considering the fact that
mothers work fewer hours because of the demands placed on them by
caretaking. And the depression in mothers' wages is life long; it does
not end when childhood ends.170
166. On the harms of unwanted sex, see id. at 133-35; Becker, supra note 163, at 193-97.
167. Marilyn Frye, Oppression, in THE POLITICS OF WAR 1, 2 (1983).
16& Id. at 2.
169. See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 70.
170. See, e.g., ANN CRITFENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
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Mothers who work for wages work more hours than other
workers when caretaking is included. Mothers have less power in
marriages than women who are not mothers.171 Working mothers of
young children are often sleep-deprived as well as leisure-deprived.
Mothers who work for wages are subject to work-place rules designed
for ideal workers without caretaking responsibilities. Mothers lose
jobs because of pregnancy or absences associated with pregnancy or
caretaking (such as the need to stay home with a sick child). Mothers
who work for wages are bombarded with messages that they are
inadequate as mothers, despite mounting evidence that children in
quality daycare do as well or better than children raised by stay-at-
home mothers on every imaginable indicator of well-being.72 At
divorce, mothers are at risk of losing custody of the children for
whom they have cared and are likely to become poor because of the
inequitable distribution of assets at divorce. In general, mothers are
disproportionately poor, because being a mother depresses one's
ability to work for wages and increases one's needs, given their need
to provide for dependent children. Quality daycare for the children
of working mothers is expensive and beyond the reach of mothers
who are not at least solidly middle class. Our intensive mothering
norms, which Williams describes,7 3 place impossible pressures on
working mothers, with the result that many working mothers feel that
they are doing an inadequate job as mothers and an inadequate job as
workers.
Mothers who do not work for wages are at even greater risk of
poverty in the event of divorce. They are also more likely to be
depressed. The work they do is not valued much in their culture; they
are often seen (by themselves and others) as "only" moms.
Working women, like Franke and myself, who are not mothers
enjoy many privileges at work and at home relative to women who
are mothers. One could describe what we enjoy as "non-mothering-
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 87-109 (2001); NANCY FOLBRE,
THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUE 34-35 (2001).
171. See CRITrENDEN, supra note 170, at 110-30; JANICE M. STEIL, MARITAL EQUALITY:
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WELL-BEING OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES 24-42 (1997).
172. See, e.g., FOLBRE, supra note 170, at 63. In the Spring of 2001, the media paid
considerable attention to early reports on a study showing higher levels of aggression by
children in "childcare" rather than children cared for by their mothers, but the as yet
unpublished study used a broad "childcare" category, ignoring the quality of childcare and
including paternal care and care by other relatives as nonmaternal care. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt,
Happy Mother's Day, NATION, May 28, 2001, at 272; Valerie Strauss, Child Care Worries
Adding Up: New Study Finds Staffing Problems, WASH. POST, Apr. 30,2001, at A01.
173. See Williams, supra note 16, at 1448-52.
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working-woman privilege," similar to the white privilege enjoyed by
whites in a racist society. In Franke's writing, she fails to notice her
privilege, but that is not surprising. Part of the point of having a
privilege is that it feels natural and is typically invisible to the
privilege holder. We-non-mothering-working women-enjoy the
following privileges, just to name a few: being taken more seriously as
workers because we are not mothers; getting more sleep than working
mothers of young children; not having to worry during the day about
whether one's child is doing alright at daycare or whether she really is
getting sick and one should have stayed home with her; being able to
focus single-mindedly on our work-as most fathers do-without
having to do significant amounts of caretaking. In seeing mothering
as only too "incentivized," Franke resembles critics of affirmative
action who can only see reverse discrimination against whites and
cannot see the immense barriers (conscious and unconscious
discrimination, poor schools, etc.) faced by many people of color.
The barriers working mothers face have been institutionalized so that
they seem natural and inevitable to those not facing them. But there
is no reason why jobs cannot be structured to accommodate
mothering or why the costs of dependency should be born so
disproportionately by women. We all begin life as dependents,
whether or not as adults we care for children.
Given the disincentives to being a mother, it is amazing that
eighty percent of women nevertheless are mothers. 74 Yet Franke
only notices the disincentives for women of color. To be sure, women
of color face additional and severe disincentives to mothering. It is
difficult to raise children of color in a racist culture, particularly in
poor communities devastated by the war on drugs and gun violence,
where one must worry about children getting to and from school and
through the school day safely. Poor women of color often lack the
resources to provide adequately for their children and to send them
to good schools and quality daycare, and these problems cause
immense pain to mothers. Yet, as Franke notes, "women of color are
more likely than white women to have children in their lifetime."'75
Women are either totally brainwashed by the pressures to be
mothers, crazed, or find something of value in mothering given their
decisions to mother in the face of overwhelming disincentives. Again,
this is not to argue against easing pressures on women to have
174. See Franke, supra note 141, at 196.
175. Id.
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children when it is possible to do so without harming women who do
have children. My point is that there are already so many
disincentives to having children today that most mothers must
experience something of value in mothering.
Although not all women report that they are happy with their
decisions to be mothers, I believe most are. And most find mothering
and their relationships with their children valuable and sources of
great pleasure and joy (as well as frustration and difficulty). Mothers
speak of the importance of their relationships with their children, the
unconditional love their children give them, and the pleasure they
experience in much of mothering. 76 As described earlier in discussing
the empirical work on human happiness and well-being, we all need a
measure of autonomy over our lives, connections to others, and the
opportunity to develop our abilities. For most mothers, relationships
with their children are among the most important, if not the most
important, connections to others in their lives. Further, recall that the
happiness studies indicate that acquisition of material goods in order
to impress others not only does not increase human happiness, it can
depress human well-being by interfering with the ability to achieve
the competence, autonomy, and connections with others. 77 In terms
of human well-being, buying a Porsche is not equivalent to having a
child.
2. Maternalization of Women's Identity
According to Franke, "demanding that women's participation in
the wage labor market be compatible with our responsibilities as
mothers ... collapse[s] women's identity into motherhood."'78 This is
simply nonsense. Imagine applying this standard generally. Pushing
for workers rights would be forbidden because it collapses wage
earners' identity into their identity as workers. Tort remedies
collapse the identity of injured people into victims. Any use of law to
redress any specific problem would be inappropriate because it would
collapse the identity of those helped into one aspect of their being.
176. See generally LUIS GENEVIE & EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT: How
WOMEN FEEL ABOUT BEING MOTHERS 100-09 (1987); SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL
CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 109-10 (1996); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN:
MOTHERHOOD As EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 21-24, 31-33, 36-38 (1986); Becker, supra
note 97, at 142-53.
177. See supra Part I.B.




For Franke, commodification anxiety is a serious concern:
The push to commodify dependency work has been an important
means by which the separate spheres doctrine has been repudiated,
but what has it done for women's sexuality generally? Surely our
best strategy cannot lie in creative efforts to commodify the domain
of sexuality that is the surplus above mere procreation, for it may
be that its greatest value lies precisely in its excess.'79
What does Franke mean by the first sentence here? I am unaware of
any effect the "push to commodify dependency work" (what push?
articles and books by feminists?) has had to date on women's
sexuality. Moreover, were working mothers given the kinds of
supports and accommodation available in France, women would be in
a better position to say no to unwanted sex since they would be in a
better position to support their children above the poverty line
without a breadwinning husband. They would also be in a better
position to escape unsatisfying marriages and seek sexual pleasure
elsewhere.
More fundamentally, how precisely would supports for
caretakers commodify anything, let alone sexuality? Franke seems to
be confusing shared responsibility for the costs of child raising-such
as the subsidized daycare and family allowances enjoyed by French
working families-with a market transaction involving an exchange.
Government already does provide some support, such as free public
education from kindergarten through high school in the United
States. (One estimate puts the government share of child-raising
costs in the United States at thirty-eight percent of total costs.180)
Neither current levels of support nor higher levels would mean that
women or women's sexuality would be more "commodified" than
they are today. Women would simply have more money.
Is Franke suggesting that women are more likely to use birth
control today than they would be if they received better public
support for children? Is contracepted sex ("the surplus above mere
procreation"?) purer and finer than uncontracepted sex? Although
this is a delightful flip of the official Catholic attitude toward sex, 181 it
makes no more sense than the official Catholic insistence that
179. Id. at 187.
180. See England & Folbre, supra note 11, at 200.
181. For the official Catholic view, see generally John M. Finnis, Law, Morality & Sexual
Orientation, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1014 (1994); Robert P. George & Gerald V. Bradley,
Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995).
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uncontracepted heterosexual intercourse is inherently superior to
other sexual acts. 182
4. Child Raising As the Creation of a Public Good
Fineman argues that "[c]aretaking labor preserves and
perpetuates society and, therefore, collective response and
responsibility is warranted. Because of its public value,... caretaking
labor creates a societal or social debt."'83  Fineman does not see
children as simply a consumption choice by parents equivalent to the
decision to purchase a Porsche: "the society-preserving nature of
children helps to distinguish that preference from the whim of the
auto fan."'184
Franke makes a number of related points in rebuttal. First, she
argues that production and consumption cannot be distinguished in
economic terms: "if there is anything we have learned as members of
modern political economies, it is that consumption is society-
preserving work.' 185 But it is possible to distinguish between public
goods and other productive behavior, which is Fineman's point. As
economists Paula England and Nancy Folbre explain:
[T]he time, money, and care that parents devote to the
development of children's capabilities create an important public
good whose economic benefits are enjoyed by individuals and
institutions who pay, at best, a small share of the costs. Economists
define a public good as one that is difficult to put a price on because
it is nonexcludable (someone can enjoy it without paying for it) and
nonrival (one person can enjoy it without diminishing someone
else's enjoyment of it). Individuals who do not contribute to the
production of public goods are likely to ride free on other people's
efforts unless their responsibilities are enforced through explicit
laws and rules, including taxes.186
Children who grow into responsible adults do not benefit only their
parents (let alone only their mothers, who in most instances make the
greatest investment in them). Children become taxpayers (thus
benefiting all who live in the country) when they are adults. We all
182. For a criticism of the Roman Catholic Church's official position from the perspective of
women, see Becker, supra note 163, at 188-91. For a discussion of the historical background of
the Catholic position, see Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restriction on
Same-Sex Marriage: Two Are Better Than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 17-27 (2001).
183. Fineman, supra note 15, at 1410-11; see also Fineman, Cracking the Foundational
Myths, supra note 12, at 19.
184. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 12, at 21 n.15.
185. Franke, supra note 141, at 190.
186. England & Folbre, supra note 11, at 195.
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benefit by a new generation of workers as we age, people able to
collect the garbage, empty our bedpans, and keep the wheels turning.
We all benefit from friends, coworkers, spouses, though we did not
raise them.8 7 These benefits enjoyed by those who have not invested
in the child are "externalities." Unless nonmarket mechanisms are
used to spread the costs of raising children, people will be allowed to
ride free on the investments of others.
To give a concrete and dramatic example: social security is
structured to support the elderly by transfers from the working-age
population. Therefore, our ability to receive social security benefits
depends on a younger generation of workers generating revenue for
the system. Yet those who benefit most are not necessarily those who
have contributed most to the next generation:
[C]onsider two individuals who have the same marriage and
employment history-they will receive exactly the same retirement
benefits from Social Security, even if one of them raised three
children who grew up to become productive members of society
and to pay taxes on the income they earned, while the other raised
none and simply enjoyed higher levels of personal consumption.
Current policies in the United States socialize many of the
economic benefits of children while requiring parents, mothers in
particular, to pay most of those costs.188
Thus, Franke misses Fineman's point entirely. Whether production
and consumption are distinct categories is irrelevant. What is
relevant is the distinction between production of public goods and
other production or consumption activities.
Next, Franke argues that parents' reasons for having children are
often selfish rather than altruistic. Again, this wholly misses the
mark. Parents may have children and raise them to be productive
and responsible citizens entirely for purely selfish reasons (though I
believe that most do not). It is nevertheless true that others enjoy the
benefits of the parents' (particularly the mothers') labor, when the
children become productive adults. These others receive a free ride
at the parents' (particularly mothers') expense unless they bear some
of the costs. In addition, some parents (particularly the poor) will
under invest in developing their children's capabilities relative to the
value of their children as productive and responsible members of
society unless they receive public supports.
187. Id. at 195-96.
188. Id. at 196.
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In a related point, Franke argues that we give parents property
rights over children, allowing parents to decide to home school their
children to ensure that they will not share the public values of their
culture, such as "tolerance, equality, and humanity. ' '189  Such
treatment is, she maintains, inconsistent with regarding children as a
public good.19° But again, she confuses two distinct issues. Whether
children are a public good in an economic sense is one question.
What degree of autonomy parents should have over child raising and
educational decisions is another. It may well be that children will be
more likely to become productive and responsible members of society
if their parents, rather than the state, make many decisions, though
parents will not always make decisions entirely in the public interest.
Finally, Franke suggests immigration as a cheaper way of
acquiring younger generations of taxpayers and workers, noting that
our immigration policies are natalist, racist, and xenophobic. 91 I have
no quarrel with Franke's criticisms of our immigration policies. But
the idea that, instead of supporting caretakers because they produce a
public good, we should rely on immigration for social reproduction is
bizarre. It is not going to happen. Most women are going to continue
to have children as they have throughout human history. The
question Fineman and Williams are raising is whether mothers (a
disproportionately poor group) should disproportionately bear the
costs of child raising given that raising children creates a public good,
a benefit to us all.
What would Franke do with poor children (who will continue to
be born)? Without supports, they will not be able to develop their
capabilities to become the productive citizens they could be. There
are moral, not just economic, reasons for supporting care of
dependents. The moral needs of poor children in our rich nation are
shocking, yet Franke never mentions the effect her approach would
have on poor children.
Moreover, the public-goods argument is in part an argument
grounded in fairness and justice. If we were to stop having children
and instead import our next generations, we would simply be shifting
the cost from American women to women in other (poorer) countries
while continuing to reap where we have not sown. And we will be
separating those women (unless they are willing to immigrate at
189. Franke, supra note 141, at 191-92.
190. See id. at 191.
191. See id. at 194.
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middle age or later to the United States) from the children in whom
they have invested. This is hardly a humane solution.
In an article in Nation, Deborah Stone argues for a right to care
and to care for others: "Care is as essential as the air we breathe." 192
Human beings need care as children. The seriously ill and the elderly
need care as well. Surely the citizens of the richest country on earth
can afford care and to care for others.
5. Unfairness to Taxpayers Who Are Not Parents
Franke argues that taxpayers who are not parents should not be
forced to support parents just because parents wish to fulfill their
children's desires for consumer goods.193 There are two important
points to be made here. First, if children are a public good, as argued
in detail above, then there is a reason for public support of them:
there will be a public payoff when the children become adults who are
productive members of their society and taxpayers (a benefit
particularly for those who are elderly). But this requires that children
be given the resources to develop their capabilities, which means that
they must be integrated into their communities and able to interact
with their peers. These ends require, not that every child have every
new gizmo, but that they have more than the bare minimum
necessary to keep body and soul together. In any event, no child
support program, even one as generous as the French system, is
actually going to give parents enough to buy toys rather than just help
in providing for food, shelter, clothing, and educational needs.
Second, each of us began as dependent children. And those of
us, like Franke and myself, who grew up in the baby boom
generation, enjoyed exceptionally high levels of subsidies to our
families as we were growing up. In the fifties, close to seventy percent
of the adult population had school-age children.194 Today the number
is below thirty percent.195 Not surprisingly, when we were growing up,
there was strong public support for a good education system and
many subsidies to suburban families. 196 Perhaps Franke never went to
public school and did not benefit from any of the subsidies for
192. Stone, supra note 9, at 13.
193. See Franke, supra note 141, at 192.
194. STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 278 (1992).
195. Id.
196. See id. at 76-79.
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suburban housing, transportation, etc.197 But most people growing up
in the fifties and sixties did. We (or most of us) were supported by
government as well as our parents when we were growing up. Now it
is payback time. We have obligations both to support the elderly (as
our parents and other workers did when we were children) and to
support today's children (as our parents and other workers did when
we were children).
6. Natalism, Racism, and Decolonialization
Franke objects to "natalist solutions" (i.e., raising our own
children) on the ground that preferences for such solutions over
immigration "have often taken the form of loosely-veiled racism,
xenophobia, or decolonization.' 1 98 This is no doubt true. But it is
emphatically not true that people have children only for racist or
xenophobic reasons.
More to the point, imagine eliminating any human endeavor
which has "often taken the form of loosely-veiled racism" or
xenophobia. (I am not quite sure what "decolonization" means in
this setting and hope racism includes "decolonization.") Religion has
often taken the form of loosely-veiled racism and xenophobia (as well
as sexism), as has science, literature, the arts, academic studies in
general, education, and politics. I do not see how we could apply this
standard and continue any human endeavor. It is, then, inappropriate
to apply it only to parenting, although we must fight for policies that
are not racist or xenophobic and oppose those that are.
7. Real Women and Real Children
I believe that the point of feminism is to improve the quality of
women's lives in the. real world in conjunction with improving the
lives of other vulnerable people, particularly children. As the tables
below illustrate, the well-being of women and children are closely
linked. In the real world, most women are mothers. Without a
doubt, women are under considerable pressure to be-and not to
be-mothers. But if most women are mothers, feminists should be
pushing for changes to improve the lives of women who are mothers.
Franke is careful to avoid actually stating that she opposes feminist
197. If she did not, it was because she was extremely lucky-born to parents who did not
rely on government subsidies in any way. And that luck would not be something earned or
deserved.
198. Franke, supra note 141, at 194.
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efforts to improve the situation of mothers.199 But the thrust of her
arguments certainly cuts against any efforts to improve mothers' lives.
In the real world, too many women and children are poor. Table
1 shows poverty rates by family type after cash transfers and
illustrates the precariousness of many women's lives, particularly if
they are mothers in households without men.
TABLE 1
POVERTY RATES BY FAMILY TYPE AFTER CASH TRANSFERS
1999200
ALL FAMILIES 9.3% HISPANIC FAMILIES 25.0%
WITH CHILDREN < 18
Married couple 4.8% Married couple 16.8%
Male head only 11.7% Male head only 26.0%
Female head only 27.8% Female head only 46.6%
FAMILIES WITH 13.8% ANGLO* FAMILIES 8.0%
CHILDREN < 18 WITH CHILDREN < 18
Married couple 6.3% Married couple 3.9%
Male head only 16.2% Male head only 11.9%
Female head only 35.7% Female head only 25.4%
BLACK FAMILIES 28.9%
WITH CHILDREN < 18
Married couple 8.6%
Male head only 21.4%
Female head only 46.1%
*This entry is for non-Hispanic white families.
Women heading households with children under eighteen,
whether African American, Hispanic, or non-Hispanic white, are
much more likely to be poor than married women and are also much
more likely to be poor than single African American, Hispanic, or
non-Hispanic white men heading households with children under
eighteen.
199. See id. at 197 ("[Fleminists should not abandon a concern for the role of reproduction
and mothering in women's lives. Instead we could stand to pay closer attention to the taken for-
grantedness of motherhood in feminist legal theory.").
200. JOSEPH DALAKER & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 1999 (P60-210),
at B-11-19 tbl.B-3 (2000).
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Children are poor in the United States at shockingly high rates.
Close to one-fourth of children in the richest nation on earth live in
poverty, as illustrated by Table 2.
TABLE 2
CHILDREN IN POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1999201
Prior to taxes but After taxes and
including cash benefits non-cash benefits
ALL RACES
All children < 18 16.9% 12.0%
Children < 6 18.0% 12.8%
Living with single mother 30.4% 22.1%
BLACK
All children < 18 33.1% 22.8%
Children < 6 36.6% 26.0%
Living with single mother 41.0% 28.2%
HISPANIC
All children < 18 30.3% 21.9%
Children < 6 30.6% 21.7%
Living with single mother 40.7% 31.0%
NON-HISPANIC WHITE
All children < 18 9.4% 6.8%
Children < 6 10.0% 7.1%
Living with single mother 19.8% 15.2%
201. Id. at 28-32 tbl.5.
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As Tables 3 and 4 illustrate, children are more likely to be poor
in the United States than in other countries with similar economies,
and the poverty rate of women relative to that of men is higher in the
United States than in other similar countries.
TABLE 3
CHILD POVERTY SELECTED INDUSTRIAL NATIONS CIRCA
1990202
Pre-taxes Post-taxes
Country and transfers and transfers
Canada 23% 15%
United States 29% 25%
Australia 21% 15%






Table 4 reports the results of a recent study comparing poverty rates
for women and men in eight industrialized nations. The United
States has the highest disparity between male and female poverty
rates of any nation studied. In the United States, thirty-eight percent
more women than men are poor, yielding a poverty ratio of 1.38
(women to men). As Table 4 illustrates, women are less likely than
men to be poor in Sweden (where only seventy-three women are poor
for every 100 men). Of the industrialized nations in this study, with
the exception of Australia, all have considerably better poverty ratios
for women. The Australia ratio is lower than that of the United
States, but not nearly as low as in the other countries studied.
202. Colin Hughes & Kerry McCuaig, When Mom Must Work: Family Day Care As a
Welfare-to-Work Option, Section 2, Table 1 (2000), at http://www.childcarecanada.org/
CPAGCCEF/moms-welfare/two.html. Poverty rates vary with the definition of poverty being
used.
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TABLE 4
POVERTY RATIOS (WOMEN TO MEN) IN SELECTED
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AFTER CASH TRANSFERS20 3
Poverty ratio









Because people sharing a household are assumed to share income, a
poverty ratio other than one (one poor woman for every poor man)
reflects the extent to which women are not living with men. Women
living in households without men are likely to be poor for three
reasons. First, women earn less than men in the wage-labor market.
Second, women living without a male partner are more likely (than
men living without a female partner) to be living with and supporting
children. And third, being a parent depresses women's wages, though
not men's. Indeed, motherhood depresses women's earnings even
after taking into account time off for childcare.201 Men tend to earn
more when they become fathers.205
Franke never mentions the implications of her argument for poor
women and children. If, as feminists, we want to improve the
situation of real women living in the real world, often in poverty with
real children, we must support the care movement. And, as Williams
notes, if we are to provide better long-term supports for the poor, we
must provide broad supports to all or most working families.206
203. Karen Christopher et al., Women's Poverty Relative to Men's in Affluent Nations: Single
Motherhood and the State, tbl.2 (2000), at http://www.jcpr.org/wp/wpprofile.cfm?ID=126.
204. See FOLBRE, supra note 170, at 34.
205. See id. at 35.
206. See Williams, supra note 16, at 1454-57.
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CONCLUSION
In this Commentary, I have tried to strengthen the arguments for
better supports for and accommodation of caretakers that Fineman
and Williams have made in this Symposium and in their earlier work.
This feminist goal becomes urgent as globalization and corporate
strength increase and the well-being of business becomes increasingly
the measure of human well-being. It becomes urgent not just for the
good of women or of women and children, but for all. Following Sen
and Nussbaum, we need to see the primary goal of government as
care: creating an environment in which everyone is able to develop
their basic capabilities as a human being in light of basic human needs
for strong connections with others, the ability to exercise autonomy,
and opportunities develop their abilities.
